Plenty of studies document the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). Elsby (2009) argues that the macroeconomic effects of DNWR may be weak, because DNWR leads to a compression of wage increases. Using micro-data from the US and UK, he finds evidence for a compression of wage increases when DNWR binds.
Introduction
Concerns about the possibly adverse employment effects of low inflation have given rise to a plethora of studies dealing with existence and extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), such as the micro-econometric multi-country studies of Behr and Poetter (2010) , Beissinger (2009), and Dickens et al. (2007) or the survey evidence provided by Bewley (1999) . 1 The concerns are based on Tobin's (1972) hypothesis that a certain extent of positive inflation may be necessary in order to ease firms' real wage adjustments in response to idiosyncratic shocks if nominal wages are downwardly rigid ("inflation may grease the wheels of the labor market"). Though the empirical evidence overwhelmingly points to quite pronounced wage stickiness, the resulting macroeconomic effects on aggregate real wages or employment seem to be surprisingly weak which led Lebow et al. (1999) to speak of a "micro-macro-puzzle".
A possible solution to that puzzle has been offered by the theoretical analysis of Elsby (2009) .
Elsby considers an intertemporal model in which wage rigidity arises because wage cuts are followed by sharp decreases in productivity. Wage increases therefore become irreversible to some degree: firms that increase wages during upswings will find it difficult to reverse their decisions later on when the economic environment will possibly deteriorate. Forward-looking firms take the path dependence of wages changes into account when determining the optimal wage policy. They refrain from large wage increases in order to reduce the probability that wages have to be cut at a cost in the future. Moreover, since DNWR raises the wage level inherited from the past, firms do not have to raise wages as much or as often as in a situation without wage rigidity to obtain the profit-maximizing wage level. As a consequence, firms will compress wage increases as well as wage cuts in the presence of DNWR. This leads to the surprising prediction in Elsby's model that aggregate real wages growth should not be affected by DNWR, and the employment effects should be weak or non-existent.
Elsby (2009) also provides some empirical evidence for the validity of the theoretical model by observing the effects of the rate of inflation and some control variables on the percentiles of the distribution of real wage changes. According to his findings for the US and UK, a rise in the rate of inflation increases the upper percentiles and (over some range) decreases the lower percentiles of the wage change distribution. This points to a more compressed wage change distribution in times of low inflation.
This paper aims at providing a more profound empirical analysis of the effects of inflation on the shape of the wage change distribution. It does so by applying quantile regressions to the data, in addition to variants of Elsby's (2009) model specification. Moreover, in line with the empirical literature on downward nominal wage rigidity the analysis focuses on the wage change distribution of job stayers, whereas in Elsby's analysis job movers are also included. This inclusion could lead to a systematic relationship between inflation and the compression of the wage-change distribution that has nothing to do with downward nominal wage rigidity. The reason is that during economic upswings inflation rises, and at the same time more voluntary job changes occur that go hand in hand with real wage increases. In our paper we also distinguish between workers and salaried employees because it has already been shown in the literature that these groups of employees are affected differently by DNWR (see e.g. Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003) .
The empirical analysis is done for Germany for the period 1975-2007 using the IAB Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH), the Employee History File, from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. The BeH comprises the total population of people gainfully employed and covered by the social security system. After our data selection, the remaining spells enable us to analyze over 169 million earning changes.
These are composed of 50,575,416 salary changes from white-collar workers as well as 118,593,371 wage changes from blue-collar workers. Therefore we are able to analyze on average more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year.
This enormous amount of information and the high reliability of the earnings data due to plausibility checks performed by the social security institutions and legal sanctions for misreporting are important advantages of this dataset. Measurement error due to erroneous reporting is not a problem in our analysis, in contrast to studies based on compensation data from household surveys. The analysis for Germany also provides some insights about whether Elsby's (2009) predictions can be observed in a country that may already be affected by wage compression due to its labour market institutions.
The Model (Assumptions / Propositions)
The main feature of Elsby's (2009) intertemporal model of worker resistance to wage cuts is that firms will compress wage increases in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). We do not present the model, but give some intuition to it and present the key findings needed for the empirical testing. We also show to which extent Elsby's empirical results fit the predictions of the model.
Elsby's (2009) model yields prediction on the effect of inflation, π , and productivity growth, µ , on the percentiles of the distribution of real wage growth. If a firm decides to change the nominal wage, the wage change will be compressed relative to the case where there is no DNWR. The frictionless percentiles of real wage growth are determined by the rate of productivity growth. The compression of nominal wage changes will have effects on the percentiles of the distribution of real wage growth. The prediction depend on the position of zero nominal wage growth in the distribution of real wage growth -they differ for percentiles that:
1. pronominally lie in the field of zero nominal wage growth over the sample period. 2. lie over the field of zero nominal wage growth. 3. lie below the field of zero nominal wage growth.
(1) Because of DNWR a non-negligible range of the percentiles of wage growth will exactly correspond to zero nominal wage growth (or real wage growth at minus the rate of inflation).
For those percentiles the model implies that the real wage growth falls one-for-one with the rate of inflation. Due to this effect firms are able to achieve reductions in labor costs without falling back on nominal wage cuts -which are costly for the firm.
(2) In an uncertain world with DNWR nominal wage increases will be compress because increasing the wage increases the likelihood that a firm will have to cut the wage, at a cost, later on. Upper percentiles of wage growth will therefore be reduced relative to the frictionless case. But taking the path dependence of wages changes into account firms are less likely to cut wages (either in the past or in the future) and no longer need to restrain raises as much as a precaution against future costly wage cuts. If inflation is high, wages inherited from the past are less likely to have been constrained by DNWR. This allows firms to raise wages more often to reach their desired wage level. Therefore the frictionless probability that a firm wishes to reduce nominal wages,
, will decline as inflation,π , and productivity growth, µ , rise. On average this should lead to a more than one-to-one increase of the upper percentiles of the real wage growth with productivity growth as well as a rising of the percentiles with inflation.
(3) Nominal wage cuts will be compress -relatively to the frictionless case -too. A nominal "wage cut involve a discontinuous fall in productivity at the margin, so firms will be less willing to implement them." (Elsby 2009, pp. 156) The frictionless probability that a firm wishes to increase nominal wages,
, will increase as inflation,π , and productivity growth, µ , rise. Therefore the model implies that for the very low percentiles, that lie below the field of zero nominal wage growth, the real wage growth will rise with inflation and productivity growth. 
For the empirical analysis Elsby (2009) uses data taken from the New Earnings Survey (NES, 1975 (NES, -1999 for GB and data taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1971 (PSID, -1992 ) and the Current Population Survey (CPS,1979 (CPS, -2002 Elsby this could be due to advantages of the data for the UK compared to the one for the US:
the UK shows a large variation in the rate of inflation over the sample period, the data are taken from employer records -minimizing measurement errors -, and the sample size is larger. For percentiles that lie below the field at zero nominal wage growth the effect of higher inflation is diminished -but not significantly positive. The coefficient on average regional wage growth rises above unity using CPS and NES data.
Data
The empirical analysis is done for West- Beschäftigten-Historik, 2009 ). This enormous amount of information and the high reliability of the earnings data due to plausibility checks performed by the social security institutions and legal sanctions for misreporting are important advantages of this dataset. Measurement error due to erroneous reporting is not a problem in our analysis, in contrast to studies based on compensation data from household surveys.
The earnings data are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). For employees whose earnings are censored the growth rate of earnings cannot be computed. For our analysis we use non-censored earning spells of male employees from West Germany aged 16 to 65. In line with the literature our analysis is confined to "job stayers", i.e. employees who have a "stable employment relationship" with an employer.
Usually, job stayers are defined as full-time working employees who do not change the employer between two consecutive time periods. We apply a narrower (and superior) concept and require that the employee continually exercises the same job at the same employer for at least two consecutive years. 3 In contrast to our data selection, in the analysis of Elsby (2009) job movers are also included. This inclusion could lead to a systematic relationship between inflation and the compression of the wage-change distribution that has nothing to do with downward nominal wage rigidity. The reason is that during economic upswings inflation rises, and at the same time more voluntary job changes occur that go hand in hand with real wage increases.
We distinguish between workers and salaried employees because it has already been shown in the literature that these groups of employees are affected differently by downward nominal wage rigidity. 4 For more details concerning the data selection see the appendix A "Data selection and description".
After the selection, the remaining spells enable us to analyze over 169 million earnings changes. These are composed of 50,575,416 salary changes from white-collar workers as well as 118,593,371 wage changes from blue-collar workers. Therefore we are able to analyze on average more than 5,250,000 earnings changes per year. The sample size is a large advantage in comparison to the data applied in Elsby (2009) . His largest data set, the NES for Great
Britain, allows him to analyze on average less than 74,000 observations per year. For the US it is less than 24,000 (1,800) observations using the CPS (PSID). A further advantage of the German data is the longer time period of 32 years compared to 21-24 years in Elsby's analysis. A disadvantage of the German data is the fact that we are not able to observe hourly wages, but daily wages. A further difference in the data structure is that Elbsy (2009) observes wage changes for men and women while we concentrate on male wage changes.
Empirical Implementation and Results

Elsby (2009) seems to interpret his theoretical results as predictions on the unconditional
percentiles of the real wage growth distribution, because he estimates the effect of the inflation rate on the percentiles of the unconditional real wage growth distribution and then finds evidence for wage compression for the upper percentiles. This would imply that only the firms with the highest wage increases in the economy are affected by wage compression. In our view, that conclusion cannot be drawn out of the theoretical model. Rather, each firm finds itself in a situation where a compression of wage increases seems to be indicated by the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) -independently of whether the wage changes of this firm are in the upper or lower part of the wage growth distribution for the economy as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the effects of the inflation rate on the conditional percentiles using quantile regressions.
In order to enable a comparison with Elsby's (2009) results, we first estimate the impact of inflation and other variables on the unconditional percentiles of the wage growth distribution.
We then use quantile regressions to see whether evidence for wage compression can also be found for the conditional percentiles.
Impact on the unconditional percentiles
To assess whether the shape of the real wage growth distribution varies systematically with the rate of inflation because of DNWR, we have to make sure that observed differences in the shape of the distribution are not due to changes in other variables, like age and regional composition of the workforce. We therefore follow Elsby (2009) and apply the method of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) , henceforth "DFL". We use this method to estimate the counterfactual (re-weighted) real wage growth distribution that would prevail if the distribution of worker characteristics (control variables) did not change. 5 The worker characteristics (controls) for the re-weighted density are age, class of worker, a dummy for foreign nationality, qualification level and occupational field. The DFL method is useful because it requires no parametric assumptions on the effect of these controls on wage growth.
We then use the re-weighted real wage growth distribution to calculate the nth percentiles of the distribution for region r at time t ( rt n P , ).
As a first approach we estimate the effect of the inflation rate, π , on the percentiles of the real wage growth distribution -using regressions of the following form:
As inflation rate we use the log change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the log change in the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Germany. Since Elsby's (2009) model also predicts the effects of the frictionless average real wage growth, µ , on rt n P , , we take account of this effect, too. We follow Elsby and measure rt µ using the observed regional average real wage growth rate. This approach is founded on Elsby's (2009, p. 158) proposition that "Downward wage rigidity has no effect on aggregate wage growth in steady state."
The vector rt z contains the control variables. As controls we use ten region dummies for the West German states (except Berlin), a dummy for the year 1984 6 as well as the following regional variables: mean age, percentage of the educational classes, percentage of workers with foreign nationality, absolute change in the rate of inflation, percentage of the occupational fields and the current and lagged regional unemployment rate.
5 See DiNardo et al. (1996) for a description of the procedure. We used a slightly adjusted version of the dfl.ado file from Azevedo (2005) for the estimations. Grouped by regions. As the "base year" we choose the final sample year (2007). The weights are estimated using a probit model. 6 As is described in the appendix A, before 1984 the inclusion of fringe benefits to notification was voluntary.
Since 1984, one-time payments to employees have been subject to social security taxation and are therefore included in the data. This leads to a level effect on the 1983-1984 earning changes. 
The results of the SUR estimates can be found in Table 1. 8 These results are similar to those 7 See Zellner (1962 Zellner ( , 1963 as well as Zellner and Huang (1962) . The acronyms SUR and SURE are often used for the estimator.
8 For comparison, the results of a simple LSDV regression are documented in Table B1 of the appendix B.
[ Table 1 about here]
The field of zero nominal wage growth appears between the 20 th and the 50 th (70 th ) percentile using CPI (PPI) as inflation. The coefficients on the inflation are significantly negative, and the coefficients on aggregated wage growth attenuate toward zero for all these percentiles.
For percentiles below the field of at zero nominal wage growth -in our case the 10 th percentile-it can be seen that the coefficients on average regional wage growth rise (compared to 20 th percentiles). But they do not rise above unity as predicted by the model. For the UK and for the US, using the CPS, the coefficients rise above unity. The coefficient on inflation is significantly negative using VPI as inflation. Using PPI the coefficient is nonsignificantly positive. Here the prediction of the model fails -it predicts coefficients on inflation larger than zero for very low percentiles. Elsby (2009) Another reason could be the higher power of labor unions in Germany. Since the unionization of blue-collar workers (about 22%) is higher than for white-collar workers (about 13%) (see e.g. IW Köln, 2009) and due to the fact that it has already been shown in the literature that these groups of employees are affected differently by downward nominal wage rigidity (see e.g. Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003) we estimate the effects separately for the two groups of workers.
[ Tables 2a and 2b about here] 9 At a later date we will test how the coefficients for the relevant variables will react if we perform the analysis for Germany including job movers.
The results show that a wage compression in the higher percentiles only takes place for bluecollar workers. The effect of the inflation (using CPI) is nearly as high as in the US using the CPS data. For white-collar workers on the other hand the effect nearly vanishes. The coefficients for the 70 th -90 th percentile are still significantly positive -but for the 80 th percentile the coefficient is only about 1/7 of the size of the coefficient for blue collar workers. For the 90th percentile it is even only about 1/14 of the size.
Elsby (2009) interprets his theoretical results as predictions on the unconditional percentiles of the real wage growth distribution. In our view, it is necessary to look at the effects of the inflation rate on the conditional percentiles.
To observe the effect of inflation on the conditional percentiles of the real wage growth distribution we regress the real wage growth, w ∆ , on the inflation rate, π , the frictionless average real wage growth, µ , and further control variables, z . We make use of the quantile regression, introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) , which models conditional quantiles as functions of predictors:
The vector z contains, as for the SUR, the control variables but on the individual level if possible: age, educational class, occupational field, current and lagged regional unemployment rate, absolute change in the rate of inflation, ten region dummies for the West German states (except Berlin), a dummy for the year 1984 10 and a dummy for workers with foreign nationality. As a additional control variable we include the age raised to the second power. Due to long computing time we use stratified samples for the quantile regressions.
11
The predicted effect of inflation on the upper percentiles of the conditional distribution is positive for all workers at the 90 th percentile, but not significant. As for the unconditional distribution we find strong differences between the coefficients for white-collar and bluecollar workers. For the white-collar workers the predicted effect not only vanishes, it even 10 See appendix A for more details on the dummy.
11 1% sample for all worker; 2% for blue-collar worker; 4% white-collar worker; samples stratified after region, age, foreign nationality, worker class and occupational field. For all three samples the coefficients on the average real wage growth fails to exceed unity for the higher percentiles. But for the sample of all workers and the one just for blue-collar workers the coefficients are the highest and close to unity.
[ Table 3 about here]
For very low percentiles -in our case the 10 th percentile-it can be seen that the coefficients on average regional wage growth rise (compared to 20 th percentiles). But they do not rise 
Conclusions
Using the Employee History File, from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency, for the years 1975-2007 we show that Elsby's (2009) model predictions are true for Germany as long as one looks at the effects on the unconditional percentiles of the real wage growth distribution. However, those predictions imply that only the firms with the highest wage increases in the economy are affected by wage compression. In our view, that conclusion cannot be drawn out of the theoretical model.
It is necessary to look at the effects of the inflation rate on the conditional percentiles of the real wage growth distribution.
Our estimates show that the wage compression is much weaker for the conditional percentiles of the real wage growth distribution. This leads to the conclusion that Elsby (2009) overestimates the compression of wage increase in the presence of DNWR. Therefore the employment effects of low inflation should be weaken because of the compression -but not as strongly as Elsby predicts. Lebow's et al. (1999) "micro-macro-puzzle" is therefore not solved by the theoretical analysis of Elsby, but he adds at least a missing part to the puzzle. (2000) do not assume a symmetric distribution of the wage change. But they predict the contrafactual distribution of the wage change assuming that DNWR only affects the negative side of the distribution. This assumption is also put in question by the empirical results.
Because of Elsby's (2009) and our empirical analysis it is not clear anymore if DNWR leads to a rise of the average wage level. Also the results imply that the approaches to the analysis of DNWR with micro data have to be rethought.
Appendix A: Data selection and description
For our analysis we only use the earning spells from male employees from West Germany 12 aged 16 to 65. We distinguish between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. The workers must be subject to social security without particular tokens and being gainfully employed in the same occupation by the same employer all the year for at least two table A1 ).
[ Table A1 about here]
12 Except (West) Berlin.
For each employee we have the following information:
Gross annual earnings:
• salary: gross annual salary of a full-time white-collar worker • wage: gross annual wage of a full-time worker
The earnings are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). Spells with censored earnings, as well as spells with earnings higher than 0.96 times the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme, are dropped.
The lower limit of the earnings is given by the earnings limit for "marginal" part-time workers/fringe workers (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze; see 
Gross average daily earnings:
• dsalary: gross average daily salary of a full-time white-collar worker • dwage: gross average daily wage of a full-time blue-collar worker
The BeH contains no data on hours worked except for information about part-time or fulltime employment. Therefore, it is not possible to compute hourly earnings. Since we cannot observe changes in the working time -as long as the threshold for part-time employment is not crossed -we sometimes observe implausibly high growth rates of (annual) earnings.
Using gross annual earnings and the duration of the employment spell, we calculate gross average daily earnings. Since white-collar workers are being paid the same salary every month -irrespective of the number of working days -we calculate the gross average daily salary for a 365-day year. For workers we use the exact duration of the employment spell to calculate the gross average daily wages. To avoid any contamination with working time effects, only full-time employment spells are included.
Duration of employment:
The duration of employment is not consistent with the actual days worked, but represents the duration of the employment contract liable to social security. To make sure that a person is employed all the year, we drop all spells with durations of employment of less than 365 days.
Employment relationship:
The BeH contains 32 classifications for employment relationships -such as trainees, insured artistes and publicists and employees in partial retirement. We only keep employees subject to social security without particular tokens.
Class of worker:
The BeH contains eight classes of workers: (1) trainees, (2) workers, (3) skilled workers 13 , (4) master craftsmen and foremen 14 , (5) white-collar workers, (6) home workers, (7) people with less than 18 weekly hours of work, and (8) people with 18 and more weekly hours of work but not fully employed.
We drop all classes except of 'white-collar workers', 'workers' and 'skilled workers'. The two latter classes are combined to the class 'blue-collar workers'.
Occupational classification:
This variable describes the field of an employee's occupational specialization. The BeH covers 86 occupation groups containing 328 occupations. These groups are use to control for job stayer. They are subsumed to six occupational fields which are used in the regressions.
Qualification level of an employee:
This variable includes eight categories: (1) no formal education, (2) The qualification level 'no classification applicable' is subsumed to 'no formal education'.
Age of a person:
Age a person is turning in the particular year -only spells from persons aged 16 to 65 are kept. 13 The class also contains master craftsmen and foremen (Bender et al., 1996) .
14 Persons in this class are employed as blue-collar or white-collar workers.
Further data:
Contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze):
The earnings covered by the BeH are right-censored at the contribution assessment ceiling.
The contribution assessment ceiling is annually adjusted to the changes of earnings. Some employees -miners, mine-employees, sailors and railroad employees -are insured in a special pension insurance, called 'knappschaftliche' pension insurance. The contribution assessment ceiling of this pension insurance is always higher than for the compulsory pension insurance scheme (see table A2 ). Since 1999, the BeH does not indicate anymore in which pension insurance a person is insured. For this reason, we only use the contribution assessment ceiling of the compulsory pension insurance scheme.
Inflation:
As inflation we use two variables:
-Change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Germany to the previous year (see table A2 ). We interlinked the CPI (available for 1995-2007) with the cost-of-living index of all private households for West Germany (available for 1962-1999).
-Change of the Producer Price Index for Germany to the previous year (see table A2 ).
[ 
